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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
 
1.1 It is generally acknowledged that Africa’s participation in Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations (MTNs) improved both quantitatively and qualitatively 
since the launch of the Uruguay Round (UR).  This is not to say that African 
negotiators have reached the same levels of preparedness and sophistication 
as their counterparts in the developed countries.  A number of challenges still 
remain and some of them relate to capacity constraints in understanding the 
negotiations subjects / agenda due to lack of relevant training, lack of 
adequate economic and trade data and poor knowledge of the negotiations 
structure, all of which impact negatively on overall negotiation strategy.  It is 
important to note that prior to the Uruguay Round, MTNs were seen as a 
preserve of the developed countries, whilst developing countries were 
marginal to the negotiations process and were largely recipients of 
preferential market access and other special differential treatment.  No 
wonder GATT was regarded as a “rich men’s club”. 
 
1.2 The enthusiasm that characterized the involvement of the developing 
countries in UR was based on the assumption that the negotiations would 
proceed on an Agreement by Agreement basis and that due to their limited 
interest and capacity, they could choose which Agreement they wished to 
negotiate and sign.  Rege (1998) has observed that many developing countries 
which had not acceded to the Tokyo Round Agreements were not fully aware 
that “all the associated agreements that were negotiated in the Tokyo Round, as 
well as those that would result from the UR would be presented as a full 
package in a single undertaking.” ¹  
 
1.3 The birth of the WTO at the conclusion of the UR presented a challenge 
to developing countries as the WTO was to become a permanent negotiations 
forum, not only for the regulation of tariffs and trade but also for rule-making 
and with an elaborate dispute settlement system.  
 
1.4 The aim of this paper is to review Africa’s engagement with the WTO 
with special focus on the capacity challenges faced by the African trade 
negotiators.  It is mainly a reflection of the author, based on personal 
experiences as a trade negotiator in Geneva during the period 1996 – 2001 
coupled with some literature review.  It is observed that during the early 
years of WTO’s existence, no area of international jurisprudence was 
developing faster than international trade law.  It is also observed that 
although the UR had been dubbed “the round to end all trade negotiations 
rounds,” the WTO Work Programme has continued to grow at an alarming 
pace as new subjects are added to the WTO agenda.  These developments 
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have posed serious challenges to negotiations from developing countries as 
they strive to catch up, keep pace and even influence the scope, pace and 
outcome of the negotiations.  It is therefore argued that notwithstanding the 
quantitative and qualitative improvements in Africa’s participation in MTN’s, 
a lot more still needs to be done to improve the capacity of African 
negotiators and stakeholders to participate actively and meaningfully in 
negotiations.   
 
 
 
II. THE CHALLENGES  
 
 
2.1 It can be argued that although developing countries were active during 
the UR, their participation was limited by the architecture and lack of 
transparency of the negotiations structure.  A lot of work was happening 
behind their backs and it is not surprising that the resultant Agreements were 
very much tilted against them.  A detailed analysis of the imbalances in the 
URAs has been done by Das (1992).² 
 
2.2 Further, there was a mismatch in the level of preparedness to deal with 
the substance of the negotiations.  Whilst developed countries had taken years 
to study, discuss and understand issues that were coming up for negotiations, 
including an appreciation of the impact on their economies, the same was not 
true for most developing countries.  As a result, trade negotiators from 
developing countries ended up making concessions that did not serve the best 
interests of their countries. 
 
2.3 It is precisely for these reasons, particularly the imbalances in the 
negotiation preparedness, structure and outcomes that most WTO 
Agreements have a provision for the granting of technical assistance to 
developing countries by developed countries. Amazingly, such technical 
assistance was and continues to be offered in exchange for concessions during 
the negotiating process.  It must be noted that, the provision of technical 
assistance is presented in non-contractual, best endeavour language stating 
that technical assistance will be provided “upon request and on mutually 
agreed terms.” ³ 
 
2.4 In addition to the above, another capacity constraint is associated with 
having diplomatic presence in Geneva largely because of the cost of opening, 
adequately staffing and maintaining diplomatic Missions in Geneva.  Of the 
41 African members of the WTO, 34 OF them have Missions in Geneva.  On 
the average, most African countries have only two to three officers covering 
the WTO since Geneva also hosts a large number of International 
Organisations and UN Agencies. 
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2.5 It is important to note that on average, the WTO runs more than four 
parallel committee meetings per day and therefore it is difficult, if not 
impossible, for all African countries to be represented in all these meetings or 
to be adequately prepared for these meetings. 
 
2.6 Since WTO negotiations lead to country-specific and legally binding 
commitments, it is difficult for individual countries to either cede or delegate 
negotiating rights to others.  At the end of the day, you are either in the 
negotiations or you are out, but still bound by the negotiations outcome.  
Depending on the stage of the negotiations, delegations can at best exchange 
information in order to assist each other keep track of developments in the 
Negotiation Committee that they cannot cover. 
 
 
 
III. AFRICA’S RESPONSE  
 
 
3.1 Despite these challenges, African countries have continually striven to 
improve their participation in MTNs through the adoption of various 
measures at the national, regional and continental levels.  These 
improvements have demonstrated themselves both quantitatively and 
qualitatively. 
 
3.2 There has been a noticeable increase in the number of African countries 
taking an active interest in MTNs and this has translated into membership of 
the WTO.  Currently, 41 African countries are members of the WTO and six 
are negotiating to accede. 
 
3.3 There is also increased awareness and interest in MTNs shown by 
other stakeholders such as the business community and civil society who 
have partnered with governments in developing national positions.  In some 
countries, parliamentarians are showing increased interest in MTNs and it is 
hoped that their involvement will have the effect of mobilizing the generality 
of the people in following closely both the negotiating process and outcome. 
This in turn will lead to more accountability by the trade negotiators to their 
national populations.      
 
3.4 There has been a noticeable improvement in the level of consultations 
within the governments through the convening of inter-ministerial meetings 
of Ministers and officials.  There has been a similar improvement in the level 
of consultations with other stakeholders such as the business sector and civil 
society; 
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3.5 African countries have developed regional approaches through the 
institutionalization of the African Group of Trade Negotiators at the Geneva 
level and increased interest of MTN issues in the Africa Union Commission 
and African Research Networks.  African countries are also forging alliances 
with other developing countries such as the Like-Minded Group, the Group 
of 90 (ACP Group), Group of 20, among others. 
 
3.6 Yet it is important to note that Group solidarity does not necessarily 
translate into strong negotiating positions advancing the trade interests of 
African/ developing countries.  Given the different levels of development and 
trade interest, group positions have always tended to be weak because they 
are based on generalized common positions. Africa is made up of countries 
matching the following development categories: Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs); Land Locked Developing Countries (LLDCs); Net Food Importing 
Countries (NFIC); Small Island Developing Countries (SIDs); High Income 
Developing Countries (HIDCs) and Low Income Developing Countries 
(LIDCs).  In this regard, group positions are most effective where they 
represent a common response to the position of the developed partners, 
especially in relation to the expansion of the negotiations subjects/ agenda or 
WTO work programme. 
 
3.7 It remains a contentious debating point whether some WTO Ministerial 
conferences such as Seattle or Cancun failed because of developing countries’ 
solidarity or whether it was because of lack of agreement amongst the major 
trading nations.  Civil society groups that have demonstrated on the margins 
of the Ministerial conferences have also claimed responsibility for the 
deadlock in negotiations.  
 
3.8 It is also important to note that Group solidarity has been threatened 
where the developed partners have used financial resource diplomacy or 
threatened to suspend bilateral assistance programmes.  In such instances 
some members of the group are forced into silence or absenting themselves 
from the negotiating committees altogether.  
 
3.9 Some African countries have also developed issues-based alliances 
with countries outside Africa and in some instances gone into partnership 
with some developed WTO members.  Such alliances range from general 
country classifications such as LDCs, s SIDs or LLDs, to alliances based on 
common trade interests, for instance, the major agricultural producers 
establishing the Cairns group, which cuts across the North-South divide. 
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IV. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE  
 
 
4.1 From the discussions above it is clear that African countries have 
traveled a long way in the area of MTNs.  Whilst there have been a lot of 
positive developments, a number of glaring challenges still remain. Whilst 
most, if not all, WTO Agreements make reference to the need for the 
provision of technical assistance in order to facilitate developing countries’ 
participation in, and benefiting from trade negotiations, this item is not part of 
the WTO built-in agenda because of its non-contractual nature.  The various 
agreements indicate that technical assistance is provided “upon request and 
on mutually agreed terms.” 
 
4.2 Available technical assistance for trade negotiators has some major 
limitations largely because: - 
 
• Such assistance is offered as a trade-off during the negotiations.  
In this regard, the assistance does not come before the 
negotiations have started and is offered in exchange for 
concessions whose impact on national economies is not known.  
 
• The technical assistance is responsive to the trade interests of the 
donors and mostly delivered by personnel and institutions from 
the donor countries. 
 
• Where funding is given to African researchers and NGOs for the 
conduct of studies, the research proposals and findings are first 
submitted to and owned by the donors who can also influence 
both the focus and content of the report. 
 
• There has developed a Workshop Syndrome whereby capacity 
building is seen in terms of facilitating the organization of 
workshops whose content and resource persons bear little or no 
relevance to issues at stake at the negotiations. 
 
• Trade policy courses offered by the WTO Secretariat although 
useful, largely teach participants to comply with existing rules 
and do not prepare them to challenge those rules or advocate for 
new ones that advance Africa’s trade interests. 
 
4.3 Given the foregoing and other limitations, there is therefore a strong 
need for capacity building support to focus on issues relating to WTO 
awareness and preparedness, as well as the capacity to implement 
WTO agreements, to formulate policies that address the supply side 
constraints and take full advantage of the opportunities created by 
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regional economic integration.  These issues are discussed in detail 
below.  
 
4.3.1    WTO Awareness   
 
(a) The lack of functional knowledge of WTO agreements, processes and 
procedures is largely due to limitations associated with academic 
background.  Not all trade negotiators have a sound economic, 
commercial or Legal background and African Universities have not 
developed modules for the training of Trade Negotiators and Trade 
Lawyers.   
 
(b) The lack of specialized training has however not totally inhibited 
effective participation in MTNs.  Whilst such a deficit has manifested 
itself in the adoption of generalized approaches, some African 
delegates have shown amazing flexibility and adaptability by 
developing expert knowledge through their own efforts and self-
motivation.  In some instances valuable assistance has been received 
from various stakeholders such as civil society organizations and some 
independent think tanks.  However the development of such expertise 
takes time and may take up to 3 to 4 years by which time an officer will 
be due for recall to their Head Office.   
 
(c) Where basic training has been lacking in the Head of Mission 
(Ambassador) this has been manifested in the low prioritization of the 
WTO and low, if not none participation in WTO activities by that 
Ambassador.  This is largely because WTO negotiations are very 
technical and demanding and some Ambassadors are reluctant to 
display their ignorance in the negotiation committees.  They would 
rather focus on the other organizations to which they are accredited 
such as the United Nations Organisation and its agencies, ITU, WIPO, 
ICRC, among others.  In fact, a number of Ambassadors from 
developing countries have given more attention to those organizations 
dealing with political, environmental, human rights and humanitarian 
issues.  These tend to be easier to manage than the highly technical and 
contractual nature of WTO work.  Perhaps, this is a reflection of the 
weaknesses of the posting policies of most African Governments. In 
some instances there is no evidence of any attempt to match basic skills 
and competence with the requirements of a particular post. 
 
(d) Beyond the Embassy personnel in Geneva, there is need to bring basic 
awareness of WTO issues to the citizen. This involves introducing the 
history, structure, functions and existing Agreements of WTO to 
various stakeholders.  In most instances, the aim is to simplify the 
complex legal language of WTO Agreements in an attempt to educate 
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and arouse the interest of stakeholders in WTO processes and 
procedures, as well as fostering compliance with existing WTO 
Agreements.  
  
(e) However, Das (1999) has warned that “a legal text cannot be put in a 
totally accurate form in any language other than that of the text itself”⁴.  
There is therefore a danger of oversimplification, which also 
compromises legal precision, thus reducing the value and relevance of 
some WTO awareness initiatives.  As already pointed out, some WTO 
workshops that are convened to raise awareness are guilty of this 
tendency. 
 
(f) WTO awareness initiatives should target government officials in 
relevant ministries, business community, labour, farmers’ 
organizations, civil society, parliamentarians and academia, among 
others.  
 
(g) It is important to note that trade liberalisation in the WTO has been 
erroneously linked to the structural adjustment programmes  (SAPs) of 
the IMF/World Bank.  As a result, there is hostility that is directed at 
the WTO and at MTNs, which amounts to a condition of denial and 
therefore  willful neglect of the realities on the ground, particularly the 
binding nature of WTO Agreements, whether or not a WTO member 
has participated in the negotiations.  Whereas the SAPs were not 
legally binding, WTO Agreements are binding on all members.  
 
(h)  In this regard, WTO awareness initiatives should highlight the 
importance, seriousness and implications for WTO membership.  WTO 
members should not behave as if they are not members or as if they are 
not bound by WTO Agreements. 
 
(i) WTO awareness initiatives should also alert African countries on the 
erosion of preferential market access that has been evident since the 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round.  It is on the basis of such awareness 
that stakeholders should confront reality and design new strategies to 
improve production efficiency and competitiveness in order to 
maintain and increase market share.  Viewed against this background, 
the current Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) negotiations 
with the EU should help Africa address some of the supply side 
constraints. 
 
(j) WTO awareness does not and should not amount to an unconditional 
surrender to the doctrine of unfettered trade liberalization.  WTO 
awareness means alertness to the pros and cons of trade liberalization 
and the implications of WTO dispute settlement system.  After the 
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experience with the Structural Adjustment Programmes, African 
countries should be aware of the difference between free trade and fair 
trade.  
 
(k) In this regard, WTO awareness for Africa should translate into a 
demand for trade justice and the negotiating proposals for Africa 
should address issues relating to WTO governance and how the WTO 
can address Africa’s development aspirations.  
     
 
4.3.2   WTO Preparedness   
 
(a) Beyond the awareness, stakeholders should participate in the 
negotiations from an informed position.  This involves the need to 
undertake detailed technical studies and analyses in order for 
stakeholders to understand the impact of liberalization commitments 
on their economies and trade prospects.  At this stage in the history of 
the WTO, it is important for developing countries to undertake 
liberalization impact assessments before they can make further 
liberalization commitments.  In fact, a lot of technical work is needed in 
the capitals, buttressed by sufficient and relevant statistics and the 
involvement of all stakeholders in the development of national 
positions, which effectively articulate all aspects of trade interests.  An 
equal amount of work is needed in Geneva to internalize the positions 
developed at the capitals and to transform them into negotiating 
proposals.  A number of organisations such as UNCTAD, South Centre 
and Third World Network have assisted delegations in Geneva with 
technical expertise to develop concrete proposals for the purpose of 
WTO negotiations. 
 
(b) It is acknowledged that most developing countries in general, and 
African countries in particular have very weak data management 
systems.  As a result, statistics on economic and trade performance is 
very scarce and mostly outdated, thus failing to give a true reflection of 
current trends.  The biggest nightmare for an African trade negotiator 
is when your negotiating partner (from the developed countries) has 
more up to date statistical information about your country than you 
have.  Such information asymmetry has often diminished the 
confidence of well-meaning negotiators at the negotiating committees. 
 
(c) Against this background, it is therefore critical for African delegations 
to be fully prepared for WTO negotiations in a way that forces the 
major trading partners to fully respect and appreciate Africa’s trade 
interests and prospects.  Such preparations should also ensure that 
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Africa is able to draw up a positive agenda for the negotiations rather 
than merely reacting to proposals from the other groups.  
 
(d) However, it is important to note that agenda setting requires a lot of 
research, analysis and consultation before the group can agree that an 
issue is now ripe for tabling at the WTO.  In the case of developed 
countries, they rely on well-staffed and effective think tanks and 
Secretariats such as the OECD Secretariat, numerous foundations and 
even universities.  The private sector and other interested stakeholders 
also play an active role in the consultations and analyses. Africa should 
develop this capacity.   
 
(e) As already pointed out, most African governments have now set up 
inter-ministerial and multi-stakeholder committees on trade policy.  
However, these committees are more ad-hoc rather than permanent 
arrangements.  In most instances, the committees are poorly serviced in 
the sense that they do not have a dedicated Secretariat such that 
information and documentation flows are weak.  The research as well 
as the statistical base is also weak.  
 
(f) Beyond the preparations at the national level, adequate focus should 
also be given to the Geneva negotiators.  There is need to ensure that 
the selection, deployment and the resourcing of the negotiators is done 
in a way that responds to the challenges of MTNs.  Ideally, the 
negotiators should have sufficient knowledge of the national and 
regional economy and trade policy objectives.  They must be versatile, 
adaptable and should have good negotiating skills.  
 
(g) WTO preparedness also means knowledge of the negotiations 
architecture, especially the intricacies and intrigues associated with the 
Green Room process as well as the so-called Mini-Ministerial 
Conferences.  These are processes that are not provided for in the 
Agreement establishing the WTO but which de facto, determine the 
governance of the WTO.      
 
(h) The Green Room approach to WTO negotiations is an exclusive 
arrangement of the major trading countries where participants are 
called upon to articulate their trade interest in very graphical and 
precise terms.  This is also the forum where trade deals are cut. From 
the outset, African countries feel marginalized by virtue of the fact that 
as a continent, Africa only accounts for about 2% of global trade.  Thus 
Africa’s trade interest is assumed to be very small if not 
inconsequential to the MTN process.  This explains why participation 
in the Green Room process is seen by some African countries as an act 
of boosting their prestige, often personalized in the character of the 
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Ambassador, rather than the genuine pursuit of national trade 
interests.  In some instances, the choice of country to represent Africa 
in the Green Room process is carefully made to divide rather than to 
unite, to weaken rather than to strengthen the African position. In this 
regard, the drivers of the Green Room process have tended to ignore 
and not invite the WTO Africa Group coordinating country to either 
the Green Room process or the Mini–Ministerial Conferences, which 
are central in shaping the agenda and work programme of the WTO.  
Countries are thus hand picked by the majors in such a way that the 
participants do not feel obliged to report back to the Africa Group on 
the proceedings in those forums. 
             
(i) For most countries, a lot of focus is given to the Ministerial Conferences 
and not the Geneva Process.  It must be emphasized that after 
negotiations have been launched at a Ministerial Conference, the actual 
negotiations are conducted in the various Committees and Special 
Negotiating bodies in Geneva, supervised by the WTO General 
Council, which sits as an inter-sessional body.  The Ministerial 
Conference is mostly ceremonial.   
 
(j) Thus the fielding of huge delegations at the Ministerial Conference has 
very little impact, if any, on the negotiations process and outcome.  For 
most delegations, very little support is given to the trade negotiators 
during the Geneva process, which leads to rather weak national 
positions.  Sending large delegations to the Ministerial Conference is 
more of an act of prestige and visibility rather than a genuine and well-
coordinated effort to influence the content and outcome of the 
negotiations.  In fact, given the structure of the negotiations and the 
strict limits in the number of delegates allowed to participate in the 
Ministerial Conference Negotiating Committees, those large 
delegations have no value to the actual negotiating process other than 
boosting the numbers of conference tourists, spectators and 
cheerleaders.   
 
(k) Civil Society Groups and other non-state actors have also fallen victim 
to the unjustified focus given to the Ministerial Conferences.  A lot of 
research work and publications are made available to the negotiators 
just before or during the Ministerial Conferences and therefore have 
very little significance or relevance to the negotiations since most of the 
agreed texts / outcomes would have been finalized by the General 
Council in Geneva.  It is important to emphasize that such research 
work would be critical input for negotiators during the Geneva process 
and participation by non-state actors should therefore give more focus 
to the Geneva process. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
11
(l) As already pointed out, Africa’s participation in the Green Room 
negotiations as well as the Mini- ministerial Conferences is 
uncoordinated.  However, these forums, which are dominated by the 
majors, are the prime movers and shakers of the negotiations process.   
In this regard, it is critical that Africa’s participation be based on the 
proper articulation and pursuit of Africa’s trade interest rather than the 
quest for national or personal prestige by some misguided players.  
There is no doubt that once again the finance resource diplomacy or 
the promise of employment in the WTO Secretariat or some dubious 
NGO is at the center of such misrepresentations. 
 
 
4.3.3  Capacity To Implement WTO Agreements.   
 
(a) This involves the development of capacity to domesticate WTO rules 
and Agreements through appropriate legislative and policy reforms.  
One of the biggest challenges encountered to date is that developing 
countries are finding it very difficult to implement Agreements that are 
titled against them.  As already pointed out, there are serious 
imbalances in the Uruguay Round Agreements, which need to be 
addressed through the rebalancing of these Agreements.   
 
(b) In this regard, there is need to dispel the myth that the URAs cannot be 
reopened or amended.  In fact, the Doha Decision on TRIPs and Public 
Health that led to the subsequent amendment of the TRIPs Agreement 
sets the desired precedent.  However, it is regrettable that very few 
African countries have been able to use the TRIPS amendment to 
facilitate the local manufacture of ARVs and other essential medicines.   
 
(c) Thus, there is also need to develop capacity to take advantage of the 
flexibilities offered in some WTO Agreements. It maybe recalled that a 
number of Uruguay Round Agreements did provide for time 
derogations to allow developing countries to phase-in the 
implementation of those agreements.  The phase-in period was expected 
to facilitate developing countries to effect the necessary adjustments in 
order to reduce the cost and/or pain of domesticating WTO rules.  It is 
regrettable that most developing countries were not able to effect these 
adjustments within the phase-in period, and as a result, most of the 
supply side constraints have not been addressed. 
 
 
4.3.4 Capacity To Formulate Appropriate Policies  
 
(a) There is need to develop capacity to formulate policies that stimulate 
production for exports, particularly the encouragement of value added 
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products and addressing supply side constraints.  The structure of 
African exports has predominantly been dominated by primary 
products.  There is need to encourage and facilitate the beneficiation of 
Africa’s rich and diverse natural resources in order for the continent to 
derive full benefit from global trade.  This would result in increased 
export earnings, employment creation and global market share which 
would have a positive impact on poverty reduction and other 
development prospects.   
 
(b) In this regard, there is need for capacity to develop macroeconomic 
and trade-related policies as well as appropriate legal and regulatory 
frameworks to ensure that the economic environment is conducive to 
promoting both domestic and foreign investment. 
 
 
4.3.5 Capacity To Synchronize / Harmonize Negotiating Positions At The 
Bilateral, Regional And Multilateral Levels.   
 
(a) The importance of regional economic integration in facilitating Africa’s 
economic development cannot be overemphasized.  Genuine regional 
market integration will lead to the realization of economies of scale, 
higher productivity and increased competitiveness, that will in turn 
lead to the more equitable integration of Africa into the globalizing 
world economy.  Ideally, regional trade negotiations should proceed at 
a faster pace than multilateral negotiations in order to allow Africa to 
take full advantage of the opportunities and flexibilities offered by 
Article XXIV and Part IV of GATT.  
  
(b) Regrettably, Africa’s sub–regional trade negotiations are trailing the 
multilateral trade negotiations.  Most of Africa’s economic integration 
schemes have not yet been notified to the WTO. The EPA negotiations 
with the EU have in some instances caused confusion in the African 
integration schemes by forcing a re-configuration of existing regional 
economic communities.  If not handled properly, the African 
integration agenda will be dictated by and serve the interests of the 
advanced industrialized countries and not Africa’s.  It is also important 
to note that positions taken by Africa in the context of the Cotonou 
Agreement conflict with positions taken at the WTO, especially in 
relation to the treatment of Labour Standards, Investment, Government 
Procurement among others.     
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
5.1 Capacity building should address both the short-term and long-term 
challenges.  Short-term challenges relate to those associated with the trade 
negotiators in Geneva and officials in the key Ministries and institutions.  
Such capacity building interventions should go beyond the introductory trade 
policy course on WTO awareness in order to prepare officials to participate 
meaningfully and effectively in WTO negotiations. 
  
5.2 African Governments should priorities WTO negotiations and ensure 
that the deployment of staff to the Missions in Geneva as well as in the 
responsible Ministries and departments is done in a way that matches the task 
at hand.  Where staff has received appropriate training and experience, efforts 
must be made to deploy them strategically and to retain them so that they 
continue to be involved in WTO work.   
 
5.3 In the meantime, UNCTAD and African Research Institutes and other 
Networks could be mandated to work with regional organizations to design a 
Trade Policy course emphasizing the trade and development nexus. Such a 
course could help Africa to develop a positive agenda for the purposes of 
multilateral trade negotiations.  Such an agenda would articulate Africa’s 
trade interests and help develop negotiating strategies for achieving same.  It 
is important to note that the ACBF is working on a training module that could 
be used as a template for the desired trade policy course. Such a course could 
be targeted at the trade negotiators as well as the training of trainers. 
 
5.4 The ACBF project should also target tertiary institutions in order to 
capacitate them to offer comprehensive degree programmes in the relevant 
areas.  Attention should also be given to international trade law in order to 
build capacity for dealing with WTO dispute settlement system.  Most 
developing countries are currently resorting to the use of trade layers from 
developed countries whenever they have cases coming up for dispute 
settlement.  
 
5.5 A lot could also be achieved by harnessing the invaluable expertise that 
has been developed by some specialized NGOs.  As already pointed out, a lot 
of research work has been done by civil society groups but is not reaching the 
negotiators in Geneva.  At times these studies are only made available to 
country delegations during, or on the eve of the Ministerial Conference.  
 
5.6 There is need for the pooling of resources by governments, business 
sector, labour, academia and other stakeholders in order to develop joint 
training programmes and knowledge sharing.  Information Technology tools 
must be used to facilitate on-line information sharing.  
  
 
 
 
 
14
 
 5.7 A critical area that needs to be urgently addressed is that of data 
management.  There is need to ensure that statistics are accurate, up-to-date 
and available to the trade negotiator.  
 
5.8 From the above, it is clear that capacity building should be targeted at 
individual practitioners, institutions and facilities.  Given the phenomenal 
growth of international trade law, it is critical that the investment put into the 
development of the capacity of individual negotiators and practitioners is put 
to good use.  In this regard, the issue of retention of skills comes to the fore in 
order to ensure continuity and institutional memory.  It is important to note 
that some negotiators from developed countries boast of years of experience.  
In fact, it is not unusual to hear some of them referring to meetings they 
attended in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s and other past decades who are still 
dealing with GATT/WTO issues today.  In contrast, not many Africans who 
were involved at the launch, of or during, the Uruguay Round are still 
involved in the MTNs today. 
 
5.9 It may be noted that developed countries appoint technocrats to lead 
their delegations to the Ministerial Conferences.  Whilst it is the sovereign 
decision of every country to appoint the Minister to lead delegations to the 
Ministerial Conferences, our recommendation is that African countries need 
to ensure that they include technocrats and practitioners in order to give solid 
technical advice to their Ministers. It is also critical that appointments at 
Ambassadorial levels respond to the challenges of MTNs as well.  It has been 
noted that some, if not most, delegations to the Ministerial Conferences are 
top heavy.  Because of the publicity, fanfare and prestige associated with 
these meetings and their venues, senior officials who are not very 
knowledgeable on the issues on the agenda tend to insist on attending at the 
expense of technical experts.  
 
5.10 Technical assistance could also come in the form of the construction of 
new and/or upgrading of existing facilities in order for recipient countries to 
meet a particular standard so as to improve market access of their products.  
Using the example of the SPS Agreement, it is generally accepted that not all 
countries can build reference laboratories and therefore there is need for 
sharing of facilities and pooling of resources.  This approach could also be 
replicated when dealing with tertiary institutions so that certain designated 
universities can be developed into Centres of Excellence to allow for 
specialized training.  
 
5.11 Technical assistance has also been offered in the form of technology 
transfer, such as in Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement which reads  
“Developed country members shall provide incentives to enterprises and 
institutions in their territories for the purpose of promoting and encouraging 
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technology transfer to least developed country members in order to enable them 
to create a sound and viable technological base.”⁵ However, a careful reading of 
this Article shows that the obligation implied in the use of the word “shall” is 
in terms of giving incentives to their enterprises and institutions rather than 
providing technology transfer to the LDCs.  As such, the formulation used is 
non-contractual and is merely best endeavour.  
 
5.12 Finally, African countries must not be dependant on donors to provide 
for all their needs for capacity building.  It is critical that African 
governments, institutions and stakeholders should pool resources to address 
the obvious capacity constraints.  It is too much to expect that Africa’s 
competitors will provide comprehensive technical assistance to make Africa a 
global trade giant.  Given Africa’s rich natural resource base and comparative 
advantage, there is a perceived danger that the growth of Africa’s market 
share could upset the current international economic and trade relations.  
Africa must therefore develop primarily from its own efforts and ingenuity.  
 
5.13 The Uruguay Round was completed after the demise of the Cold War.  
The fall of the Soviet Union was seen as an ideological victory for the free 
market economy, which would accelerate the globalization of the world 
economy.  Capitalist ideologues celebrated these developments by forecasting 
the demise of the nation state and the emergence of a new world order where 
the free market led by multinational corporations would rule the world.  
Against this background, the WTO was to play a critical role in creating a 
binding legal framework for free trade to occur.   
 
5.14 It is therefore argued that at a time when the world is at a cross-roads, 
especially with the demise of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the 
Asian giants, Africa cannot afford to be left behind or to be marginalized in 
the process of reshaping international relations in the 21st century.  Africa 
therefore needs to develop and strategically deploy its best brains in order to 
ensure that the rules that govern global trade and financial flows are 
developed in a way that does not condemn the continent to a permanent state 
of underdevelopment.  Global trade rules should not constrict Africa’s 
development potential by limiting the policy space for governments to 
address their development challenges.  Such policy space can only be defined 
and defended by the Africans themselves.        
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